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Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton are now in the final week of campaigning before the US
presidential election on 8 November. Simon Reich examines what the result of the election could
mean for Europe. He writes that although Clinton has far more support among Europeans, both
candidates may well continue the trend of pivoting away from Europe in their efforts to shape global
foreign policy.
There are only a few days to go before the outcome of what has been an interminable, fraught and
often embarrassing US presidential election campaign. The seemingly predictable selection of
Hillary Clinton as President has been thrown into disarray by FBI Director James Comey’s announcement that it will
re-open the investigation into her emails. The political implications are, as yet, unclear. The smart money suggests
that she will still win the election, if only because of the vagaries of the US electoral system. But, even if true, the
effect on voting for US Senators – what Americans refer to as “down-ballot voting” – could be significant.
Faced with this continuously raucous process, relatively few Americans – beyond each candidate’s transition teams
– have spent much time contemplating what will happen on 9 November. And most of that discussion in the media
has focused on Donald Trump’s toying over the question of whether he will accept the results or if his supporters will
(at best) peacefully protest or (at worst) violently protest in the election’s aftermath. Comparatively little media space
has been given to the question of the actual policy consequences for both America and the rest of the world.
Europe’s support for Clinton
Europeans have generally oscillated between incredulity, anxiety, consternation and apprehension when
commenting on the consequences of the election. There has been a steady stream of puzzled comments on
American television from both elite policymakers and locals interviewed on the streets of Europe’s major capitals.
Not surprisingly, an oft-asked question is ‘how could Americans elect Donald Trump?’ It is a reasonable question.
But, Americans ask, how could the British Choose Brexit? Or how could the Italians have chosen Berlusconi? Or the
French choose….? That is the trouble with democracy – everyone gets a vote.
Naturally, Europe’s leaders see fundamental differences between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Europeans
historically favour Democrats, and this election is no exception. Indeed, despite his occasional missteps and
occasional reticence to be more engaged in European affairs, a Pew survey reports that President Obama
continues to enjoy a very high degree of popularity in Europe.
And that popularity is reflected in views toward US policy. As the authors note, “Across the 10 EU nations polled, a
median of 77% have confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs, including more than eight-in-ten in
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and France.” A comparable degree of confidence largely, although not quite as
extensively, extends to Hillary Clinton. Seventy-seven percent of respondents expressed confidence in Obama this
summer (he has always scored above 70% on this measure) while 59% said the same about Clinton.
This is not particularly surprising. First, by all measures, Clinton was highly regarded as Obama’s Secretary of State,
both at home and abroad. Working through the process of multilateral consensus building, she deferred to Obama
when necessary and listened to the views of Europe’s leaders on key issues (such as the invasion of Libya). She
attempted to implement a strategy built on her avowed principle of ‘smart power’: utilising both ‘hard’ (military) and
‘soft’ (diplomatic) tools in various combinations, according to the circumstances.
Second, Clinton has pinned her electoral campaign on the theme of continuity – extending Obama’s policies and
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consolidating his legacy. And that is a politically savvy position, with Gallup reporting that Obama’s domestic
approval percentage ratings are presently standing healthily in the mid-50s as the election approaches.
Donald Trump represents a striking, potentially frightening, contrast for Europe’s leaders. He has explicitly
discussed rapprochement with Russia, a renegotiation of NATO’s budget, and encouraged the possibility of nuclear
proliferation. His general propensity to regard foreign policy as transactional, rather than built on a foundation of trust
and institutional relationships, creates the spectre of a Europe cast asunder from an American commitment that has
been resolute, indeed iron-clad, since 1945. Not surprisingly, that same Pew poll of Europeans revealed that 85% of
those surveyed expressed a lack of confidence in Trump as President.
It therefore isn’t surprising that many European leaders yearn for Clinton’s election. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s
Secretary General, has been less than subtle in repeatedly expressing his gratitude for Obama’s “strong US
leadership’, and only last week he reiterated the unwavering commitment between the US and Europe enshrined in
NATO’s Article 5 concerning mutual defense. The EU’s response has notably contrasted with NATO’s position.
Alarmed by both the outcome of the Brexit vote and a possible US military disengagement from Europe, Frederica
Mogherini has again floated the idea of an EU army that would act as an autonomous force from NATO.
The political, budgetary and operational obstacles to creating such an army are significant – indeed, critics argue
insurmountable. But the ambition may at least have merit in recognising that a new reality is taking shape. That is
because, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, American policy toward Europe is clearly evolving in
one direction: Poll after poll reveals that Americans are tired of bearing the financial burden for Europe’s defense.
President Obama made that point explicitly clear in the run up to the NATO Summit in Warsaw. So when someone
who many Europeans regard as their resolute supporter suggests that it is time for them to stop being complacent
and increase their spending, it is pretty clear that both Clinton and Trump (albeit to varying degrees) will tell them to
do the same.
And the American scholarly debate parallels the political discussion. There, international relations academics have
been engaged in a healthy exchange over whether the United States should continue what its advocates
characterise as a strategy of ‘deep engagement’ or conversely embark of a policy of ‘restraint’ that would slash
America’s military expenditure in Europe. There is no doubt that proponents of the latter have gained momentum
over the last few years. And the combination of domestic intolerance for European recalcitrance and an explicit
intellectual agenda built on ‘American first’ will further influence the thinking of the new administration, regardless of
who is elected.
Trump and Clinton’s policies on Europe
So how will this backdrop play out in terms of future policy? It is difficult to read Donald Trump because he is so
vague when it comes to the specifics of his policies. But I am a believer in the assumption that you should take what
politicians say seriously when there is no track record against which to evaluate their behaviour – and there are
three key areas where we are likely to see marked differences between the candidates.
First, Trump has expressed a desire for a more collaborative relationship with Russia. This is where the contrast
with Clinton may be at its starkest. The Obama administration’s initial efforts to reset America’s relationship with
Russia was rebuffed. And Clinton, as Secretary of State, found life negotiating with Putin and his staff to be as
frustrating as her successor John Kerry. Scarred by that experience, she has been resolute in expressing a
willingness to support NATO in resurrecting a (symbolic, if not necessary operationally effective) defense in Eastern
Europe. That mutual hostility between Clinton and Putin has found a conduit through the Ecuadorian embassy in
London where ‘transparency’ has been sacrificed in favour of partisan expediency.
Second, Clinton may have expressed a healthy scepticism about free trade in attempting to embrace Bernie
Sanders’ supporters. But her track record demonstrates that she is a proponent of its virtues. The signing of
Europe’s CETA free trade deal with Canada has set a precedent for the resurrection of the TTIP agreement between
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Europe and the United States. No doubt the negotiations would be arduous and even quarrelsome given both
America’s and Europe’s effectively federal systems. But there would be renewed ambition if CETA was used as a
model. Trump, in contrast, has courted a constituency of voters that are so unquestionably hostile to free trade that
they make Belgium’s Walloons look like avowed liberals.
Finally, and partially dependent on the outcome of the first two factors, the European Union will itself continue its
own course of retrenchment. Despite the EU’s June publication of its Global Strategy report, it has steadily
embarked on being less of a global player in the course of the last three years. Pressured by Russian belligerence
and unprecedented migration flows, the EU has slowly but perceptibly abandoned its ‘out-of-area’ commitments in
favour of guarding its borders on land and at sea. An engaged Clinton presidency might slow that process. A Trump
one will surely hasten it.
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